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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on three European macro-regions: the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), the –revamped- Benelux, 
and the Danube Region (DR). It makes a comparative analysis of these three schemes of regional integration 
within (and in some cases beyond) the EU. The paper discusses literature on differentiated integration as well as 
literature on (old and new) regionalism and territorial governance. It develops an analytical framework which 
involves various aspects of differentiation/regionalization: time, matter, drivers for differentiation and /or 
regionalization, membership, institutions, decision-making, and modes of governance. Through desk-research 
(policy documents, websites, and earlier research) the framework is applied to the three macro-regions at hand. 
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the macro-regional strategies for the BSR and DR are almost identical, 
that the Benelux is different from the other two macro-regions, but that there also is some convergence, with the 
Benelux becoming more open and process-oriented, and the BSR and DR being effectively institutionalized by 
the EU. Rather than being a threat to European integration, the macro-regional strategies of the EU have 
essentially strengthened its position. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Within the EU we have witnessed the relatively recent emergence of so-called macro-regions, or intentions to 
create such regions. Examples are the Baltic Sea Region, the Danube Region, the European North Sea Strategy, 
the Black Sea Synergy, and the Adriatic-Ionic Initiative, to just name a few cooperation schemes (which 
admittedly vary considerably in nature). From a different perspective, we can also recently witness the 
emergence of the use of the formal EU differentiated integration mechanism, enhanced cooperation, in the field 
of divorce law and in the field of patents. These cooperation schemes are probably just the proverbial tip of the 
iceberg, as enhanced cooperation schemes are now discussed in several other policy fields as well. More 
generally, ever since the 80s, flexible integration schemes within the EU have been used more and more, and 
have been the topic of academic and political debate. This paper discusses the emergence of macro-regions in the 
European Union (EU) as an appearance of both flexible integration and regionalization, here understood as the 
cooperation between sovereign jurisdictions
2
 that are in geographical proximity.
3
  
 
The paper focuses on three European macro-regions (or: three cases of regionalization): the Baltic Sea Region 
(BSR), the –revamped- Benelux, and the Danube Region (DR). It makes a comparative analysis of these three 
schemes of regional integration within (and in some cases beyond) the EU, by looking at the drivers for the 
establishment of macro-regions, their policy domains, their institutional set-up, their membership, and their 
modes of governance. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. 
First, when discussing macro-regions in the EU, it is important to link macro-regions to but at the same time 
demarcate them from other types of so-called non-uniform (or: flexible) integration within the EU. To that end, 
section 2 discusses various concepts of non-uniform integration, resulting in dimensions of differentiated 
integration that can later be applied to macro-regions. 
Secondly, our premise is that regionalization starts from regionalism. Regionalism is here understood as the 
approach that is applied in establishing concrete regionalization schemes. Section 3 discusses insights from the 
literature on regionalism, especially the distinction that has been made between “old” and “new” regionalism. 
Both parts of the literature will then be put into a single analytical framework to typify and describe macro-
regions. Up till now, with the exception of Groenendijk (2011) and Matarrelli (2012), literature on 
regionalization and literature on differentiated integration have not been brought together. 
Consequently, in section 4, we will tentatively apply this framework to the three macro-regions at hand. To do 
so, we will first briefly discuss the EU macro-regional strategies in general and the three macro-regions 
specifically, and then discuss the different parts of the framework. 
                                                 
2
 A less general definition would refer to any such cooperation between nation states, thereby excluding 
cooperation schemes which involve jurisdictions within nation states (e.g. autonomous regions). 
3
 See Hettne (2005) for a discussion of the concepts of regions, regionalism and regionalization. We stay out 
here of a discussion of the concept of regions. As Hettne states it is widely accepted that there are no `natural’ 
regions: definitions of a region vary according to the particular problem or question under investigation. 
Regionalism refers to a tendency or political commitment to organize the world in terms of regions; 
regionalization is the actual –often complex- process of forming regions and the resulting regional cooperation.  
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Based on this analysis, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. NON-UNIFORM INTEGRATION AND MACRO-REGIONS 
 
2.1 Non-uniform integration 
As argued elsewhere (Groenendijk 2007, 2012), contrary to common belief, EU member states have always and 
substantially been involved in alternative integration schemes, outside the EU, as well as in differentiated 
integration, within the EU. The classic community method of uniform integration throughout the EU is 
increasingly becoming a myth, as member states get more and more engaged in flexible integration schemes 
which do not involve all 27 member states and/or involve nation states from outside the EU. Non-uniform 
integration is a permanent feature of the European integration process, but it has increased considerably from the 
early 90s.
4
 Such non-uniform integration within the EU often takes the form of cooperation between sub-sets of 
EU member states on particular policy challenges. Recent examples include enhanced cooperation schemes on 
family law (i.c. procedures in divorce law) and on the European Union patent. Another recent example is the 
Treaty on Stabilisation, Coordination and Governance in the EMU (involving all EU member states except or the 
United Kingdom and the Czech Republic); the EMU as such is probably the most obvious example of non-
uniform integration. Another less recent example is the establishment of the Schengen Area. Examples of non-
uniform integration which also involves non-EU member states are the Bologna Process and the European Patent 
System. 
In the 80s and 90s non-uniform integration has been discussed in the literature under a large number of different 
terms (core Europe, vanguard groups, multi-speed Europe, afgestufte Integration, concentric circles, variable 
geometry, the European Onion et cetera). This part of the literature mainly dealt with visualising non-uniform 
integration schemes and with finding adequate metaphors to capture the phenomenon. With some exceptions 
(like Stubbs, 1996), it generally is lacking in terms of robustness of conceptualization
5
. Additionally, some 
literature has dealt with the formal scheme (introduced in the Nice Treaty) of closer or enhanced cooperation.
6
 
Here we focus on more recent literature in which various attempts have been made to conceptually make sense 
of non-uniform integration.
7
  
                                                 
4
 See Schimmelfennig, Leuffen & Rittberger (2011) for a quantitative analysis of differentiation practice in the 
EU (1950-2010). 
5
 See for a detailed discussion of these concepts and for literature references: Groenendijk (2007, 2012). See also 
the contributions in Dyson & Sepos (2010). See Holzinger & Schimmelfennig (2012) for an assessment of the 
state-of-affairs in research in this field, which is adequately captured in the title of their contribution: many 
concepts, sparse theory, few data. 
6
 See also Groenendijk (2007, 2012). 
7
 In this paper we will not discuss the –often: tentative- explanations that have been put forward for 
differentiated integration, often based on traditional European integration theories. See Kölliker (2001), 
Schimmelfennig, Leuffen & Rittberger (2011), Holzinger & Schimmelfennig (2012). 
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2.2 Su’s schemes of sub-integration 
In discussing sub-integration, the yardstick is uniform integration (or: monolithic integration) as the default 
mode of EU integration: integration that is uniform in time and matter for all members of the integration scheme. 
According to Su (2005), sub-integration then refers to an instance of integration that takes place among some but 
not all members of an already existing (larger) integration, and it can take different shapes. The first distinctive 
feature is whether sub-integration takes place within the EU institutional framework or not. The second feature 
refers to the policies that are involved. Sub-integration can deal with policies that are within or outside of the EU 
policy domain (as marked out by the relevant EU treaties). If sub-integration uses another institutional 
framework than the EU framework it can either be labelled new integration or alternative integration. New 
integration refers to sub-integration outside the EU institutional framework dealing with policy areas that are not 
part of the EU policy domain. Sub-integration outside the EU institutional framework, concerned with policy 
areas that are within the EU domain, is called alternative integration. In both cases it is possible to cooperate 
either among EU Member States only or with outsiders as well (third countries).  
If sub-integration occurs within the EU institutional framework, there are again two possibilities. One may call 
odd integration sub-integration that employs EU institutions but deals with policies outside the EU domain. The 
term differentiated integration is used to denote sub-integration taking place both within the institutional 
framework and within the policy domain of the EU. 
Table 1 lists the various forms of sub-integration. 
 
Table 1: Types of sub-integration (adapted from Su, 2005)
8
 
Differentiated integration Within the EU framework, dealing with policies within the EU domain 
Odd (or: alienated)  integration Within the EU framework, dealing with  policies outside of the EU domain 
Alternative integration Outside the EU framework, dealing with policies within the EU domain 
New integration Outside the EU framework, dealing with policies outside of the EU domain 
 
 
2.3 Vertical integration, horizontal integration and differentiated integration 
Following and paraphrasing Schimmelfennig, Leuffen & Rittberger (2011) three dimensions can generally be 
distinguished regarding polity configurations (or jurisdictions): 
 level of centralization: ranging from “loose” coordination to full supranationalization; 
 functional scope: ranging from small (authority over a single-issue) to wide (authority over multiple issues); 
 territorial extension: ranging from a single territory to several territories. 
They argue that integration theory has traditionally focused on the first two dimensions (centralization and 
functional scope), from the perspective of the two main strands of integration theory (intergovernmentalism and 
neo-functionalism). Subsequently, they collapse functional scope and centralization into “vertical integration” 
and let “horizontal integration” refer to the territorial dimension (i.c. the extent to which the EU covers Europe). 
“Differentiated integration” then refers to a situation in which one or more EU member states is excluded from 
an EU policy regime. Horizontal integration and differentiation integration are then combined into four 
constellations of horizontal differentiation: 
                                                 
8
 Su (2005) uses the term opt-out integration for alternative integration. This is not followed here as opt-outs are 
very often associated with differentiated integration. 
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 Unity: EU rules apply to all EU members uniformly and to EU members only; 
 Internal differentiation: EU rules apply to EU members only, but not to all EU members (example: EMU); 
 External differentiation: EU rules also apply to non-EU members (example: European Economic Area) 
 Internal and external differentiation combined: EU rules apply to some EU members and to some non-EU 
members (example: Schengen). 
In their empirical analysis they find that exclusively internal differentiation is relatively rare; most cases of 
horizontal differentiation are cases of external differentiation and/or combinations of internal and external 
differentiation. Generally, horizontal differentiation emerged in the early 1980s; up till then unity was the 
dominant integration mode. 
 
2.4 Dimensions of differentiated integration 
Building on Stubbs’ (1996) three-way classification of differentiation in time, space and matter, Holzinger & 
Schimmelfennig (2012) have put forward six dimensions of differentiated integration: 
1. Permanent versus temporary differentiation; 
2. Territorial versus purely functional differentiation; 
3. Differentiation across nation states versus multi-level differentiation; 
4. Differentiation within the EU treaties versus outside of the EU treaties; 
5. Decision-making at EU level versus at regime level (club decision-making); 
6. For member states only versus also for non-member states/areas outside the EU territory. 
Dimension (1) is straightforward; it refers directly to Stubb’s dimension of differentiation in time. 
Dimension (2) is problematic; it refers to Stubb’s second and third dimension: differentiation in space and 
matter. Holzinger and Schimmelfennig argue that differentiation always has a territorial aspect and always has a 
functional (or: sectoral aspect). They state that differentiation in space and matter is actually about fixed and 
flexible memberships in regimes, but still they make a difference in territorial versus purely functional 
differentiation. Their application shows that this distinction does not really work; all their models of 
differentiated integration are territorial; they can only put forward Frey and Eichenberger’s (1997) Functionally 
Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) as an example of an exclusively functional scheme of 
differentiated integration. This does not do justice to the idea of FOCJ; the territorial aspect is also relevant to 
FOCJ. The idea of FOCJ is that jurisdictions that deal with specific functions can territorially overlap with 
jurisdictions that deal with other specific functions. I.e. FOCJ do not follow the same territorial pattern; they are 
not territorially embedded in a fixed administrative structure (as in a Russian doll model
9
). This is probably what 
Holzinger & Schimmelfennig mean by fixed/flexible membership, but the formulation of their second dimension 
is confusing. Dimension (3) refers to the involved jurisdictions: often -as in the analysis of Schimmelfennig, 
Leuffen & Rittberger (2011)- differentiated integration is limited to cooperation schemes between nation states; 
in line with our earlier definition of regionalization it can however involve sovereign jurisdictions at all levels. 
Dimension (4) refers to Su’s mode of alternative integration. 
                                                 
9
 Jauhiainen (2013) uses the concept of “bounded” regions, whose territorial governance is hierarchically 
arranged as a series of spatially nested territorial tiers encompassing increasing number of inhabitants. 
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Dimension (5) is about the sovereignty in terms of decision-making of the differentiated integration scheme: are 
decisions taken by the EU or is this the competence of the regime itself? 
Dimension (6) is straightforward: does the regime reaches outside of the EU or not? 
 
Groenendijk (2007) has put forward some other relevant dimensions: 
 differentiated integration may deal either with a single issue (or a few single, nonrelated issues) or with a 
multitude of (potentially interrelated) policy issues; 
 it can differ as far as the size of the group of insiders is concerned (relative to the size of the group of 
outsiders); 
 it can be open to newcomers or closed. 
In addition, and following up on the discussion above on the territorial/functional aspect of differentiated 
integration, two other aspects should be taken into account: 
 is the differentiated integration scheme embedded into the existing administrative structure (or: institutions) 
or does it involve the creation of a new administrative structure? To illustrate this point with an example 
from regional/local governance: if, within a nation state, municipalities cooperate in providing primary and 
secondary education, the cooperation scheme is still embedded into the existing administrative structure. If 
new school districts are established and formally tasked with providing such education, the administrative 
structure is changed: (single purpose) jurisdictions are added to the basic structure of (multipurpose) 
government; 
 does the functional cooperation involve geographical proximity or not? In the case of cross-border 
cooperation (like with Euregios) the functional aspect is all about geographical proximity; in the case of 
EMU, or with the enhanced cooperation mechanism for divorce law, for example, the functionality is not 
necessarily about geographical proximity.  
Taken these issues into account and combining them with (some of the) the issues and dimensions put forward 
above, we derive table 2 with the following dimensions of differentiated integration. 
 
Table 2: Dimensions of differentiated integration 
Permanent or temporary 
Single issue or multi-issue 
Open or closed 
Embeddedness of policy area(s): inside EU policy domain or outside 
Embeddedness of institutions: use of existing EU framework or use of own institutional framework 
Embeddedness of decision-making: EU decision-making or –sovereign- club decision-making 
Nature of decision-making: “loose” coordination or centralized/supranational 
Nation states only or multi-level 
Geographical proximity relevant or not 
Small or large (insiders/outsiders) 
Territorially exclusively inside the EU or also outside 
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3. OLD AND NEW REGIONALISM, AND TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE 
We now turn to the second part of literature which is relevant to making sense of macro-regions: the literature on 
regionalism. We focus here on Wallis (2000/2009) who has contrasted “old” regionalism (which according to 
him has been the dominant school of thought of practice in regionalisation from the 1880s to the 1980s) and 
“new” regionalism by looking at six characteristics. In table 3 these characteristics are listed and briefly 
discussed (following but different from Wallis, 2000/2009 and Williams, 2005).
10
 
 
Table 3: Old versus new regionalism 
“Old” regionalism “New” regionalism 
Government: top-down establishment of new layers 
in the hierarchy of governments, with nation states as 
main actors 
Governance: bottom-up, goals-oriented, networks-
based, with involvement and shared responsibility of 
various public and private actors 
Structure-oriented: focus on formation of new 
regional structures (public entities), procedures as the 
pathway through these structures 
Process-oriented: process is central to creating 
vision, resolving conflict and building consensus. 
Closedness: focus on defining boundaries and 
jurisdictions. Delimitation and membership are 
crucial to the definition of the region 
Openness: boundaries are open, fuzzy or elastic. The 
region is defined by the issues at hand 
Coordination: hierarchical redistribution of resources 
through governments 
Collaboration/cooperation: voluntary agreements 
among equals 
Accountability & responsibility: fixed 
responsibilities and little flexibility 
Trust: as a binding element among regional interests. 
Responsibilities are flexibly shared 
Concentration of power: sovereignty of the state Diffusion of power, aimed at empowerment of actors 
 
As Wallis does, it is important to stress that the new regionalism is not necessarily superior to old regionalism. 
The old regionalism continues to offer important solutions to significant problems. Rather, the new regionalism 
is most centrally a response to a new set of problems that the old regionalism was either not aware of, or was not 
designed to address. 
 
Another strand of literature that is of interest here is that on governance dimensions of territorial cooperation. 
Based on theoretical work on Europeanization, multi-level governance and new regionalism insights, Van der 
Zwet & McMaster (2012) have put forward five dimensions of European territorial cooperation, some of which 
correspond to characteristics of old/new regionalism: 
 Top-down versus bottom-up; 
 Centrally driven versus locally driven; 
 Highly institutionalized versus loosely organized; 
                                                 
10
 Although Wallis’ typology is primarily meant for application to regions within (federal or unitary) states, the 
typology of “old” versus “new” regions can be applied to the EU as a whole (i.e. as a region on a global scale). 
The typology is also relevant for what happens in terms of region-building within the EU. As Hettne (2005) 
argues the process of regionalization in Europe is both endogenous (i.e. emerging from within the geographical 
area in question) and exogenous (i.e. acting on the challenges of globalization). Or, following Gänzle & Kern 
(2011), the process of region-building within the EU can be understood from two perspectives. First, internally, 
it can be understood from the inability of the EU to devise integration schemes that solve collective action 
problems that result from diverse membership (in socio-economic, geopolitical, cultural and political terms). 
Secondly, it can be understood as a way for the EU to provide the basis for external cooperation in a globalised 
world. 
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 Closely managed/regulated versus open/flexible arrangements; 
 Narrow involvement versus broad partnership. 
 
Bringing together the dimensions of differentiated integration and regionalism/territorial cooperation, we can 
now put together the analytical framework that will be used in the remainder of this paper. 
 
Table 4: Analytical framework for description of differentiated integration through macro-regions in the EU 
Dimension Variation 
Time Permanent or temporary 
Matter Single issue or multiple issue 
 Geographical proximity important to the issue(s) or not 
 Inside EU policy domain or outside 
Drivers Top-down or bottom-up 
 Centrally driven (nation states) or regionally/locally driven 
Membership Small/narrow involvement or large/broad partnership 
 Open/fuzzy boundaries or closed/strict delimitation 
 Nation states or multi-level 
 Public or public+private 
 EU-only or EU+outside 
Institutions Embedded in existing larger framework or own/new framework 
 Highly institutionalized or loosely organized 
Decision-making Embedded in existing decision-making or new/sovereign club decision-making 
Mode of governance Hierarchical/centralized/closely managed/regulated  or loose/open/flexible 
coordination 
 Structure-oriented or process-oriented 
 Fixed responsibilities (with accountability schemes) or shared responsibilities (based 
on trust) 
 
 
4. MACRO-REGIONS WITHIN THE EU 
In this section we will apply the analytical framework to three –existing- macro-regions: the Benelux, the Baltic 
Sea Region (BSR) and the Danube Region (DR). The Benelux is a relatively old region (as a customs union 
dating from 1948, but established during the Second World War). It has been a macro-region (avant la lettre) 
within the EU ever since the European Communities started. Cooperation in the BSR dates from the late 80s (the 
Council for Baltic Sea States, CBSS, was officially founded in 1992); the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
(EUSBSR) dates from October 2009. The EU Strategy for the DR was initiated in 2009, when the European 
Council invited the European Commission to develop such a strategy, which was adopted in June 2011. 
Table 5 displays some general information on the three macro-regions. 
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Table 5: Three macro-regions compared 
 Benelux
11
 Baltic Sea Region Danube region 
EU member states Belgium 
Netherlands 
Luxembourg 
(Germany: Nordrhein-
Westfalen) 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Finland 
Estonia 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Poland 
Germany: Hamburg, 
Schleswig-Holstein, 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Slovenia 
Slovakia 
Czech Republic 
Austria 
Germany: Baden-
Württemberg, Bavaria 
Non-EU partners - Norway 
Russia 
Belarus 
Ukraine 
Croatia 
Serbia 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Montenegro 
Moldova 
Population (millions) 28 (45) 71 89 
Area (in 1000 km
2
) 1 (3.5) 1279 769 
GDP in billions of euro 1.015 (1.597) 1.375 1.620 
 
Before the actual application we will give a brief description of the three macro-regions; before doing that we 
will pay attention to the EU macro-regional strategies. 
The methodology used in this section is desk-research; it is based on (and limited to) the analysis of policy 
documents, earlier research and websites. 
 
4.1 EU macro-regional strategies 
The debate on EU macro-regional strategies should be understood in relation to various shifts in the EU policy 
framework (Dühr, 2011): with the Lisbon Treaty territorial cohesion has become a central objective in EU 
policy, the importance of territorial governance to the effectiveness of the Europe 2020 Agenda, and the related 
changes in EU cohesion policy for the next programming period. Still, as Dubois c.s. (2009) argue, the concept 
of macro-regions is not new. Although the term as such has not always been explicitly mentioned in EU policy 
documents (it is first used in a 2005 document where macro-regions are set apart from micro-regions, mainly 
smaller cross-border regions), the idea has been present between the lines for a longer period, starting with the 
2001 White paper on European Governance. According to former European Commissioner for Regional Policy, 
Samecki (2009), a macro-region  is an area including territories from a number of different countries or regions 
associated with one or more common features or challenges. The number of member states involved should be 
significantly fewer than in the Union as whole. The extension of a macro-region does not have to be identical 
with administrative boundaries of nation states but can just cover parts of those. According to DG Regio, 
boundaries of macro-regions are flexible and subject to the issue addressed. A macro-regional strategy is an 
integrated framework that allows the EU and its member states to identify needs and match them to the available 
resources through coordination of appropriate policies (Samecki, 2009). Two types of macro-regional strategies 
are distinguished. The first type deals with problems that cannot be satisfactorily addressed by regions or 
                                                 
11
 Between brackets: including Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
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countries acting alone, like environmental challenges. The second type deals with a cooperation which is 
beneficial to regions and countries involved, but not necessary in terms of dealing with such externalities. As 
Dühr (2011) points out this distinction reflects the distinction between a transnational issue and a common issue 
(used in the debate on transnationality and subsidiarity of EU funding). According to DG Regio, the European 
Commission is primarily interested in the first type of macro-regional strategy. 
 
Figure 1: Macro-regional strategy areas in the EU (taken from Dühr, 2011) 
 
 
 
So far, EU macro-regional strategies have only been prepared for and implemented in the BSR and the DR. 
Other strategies are under discussion (see figure 1 for an overview of the macro-regional areas involved). In the 
case of the Benelux the regionalization scheme exists without an EU strategy. In the case of the BSR, the EU 
21
st
 NISPAcee ANNUAL CONFERENCE, BELGRADE, 16-18 MAY 2013 
 
11 
 
Baltic Sea Strategy (EUBSR) is part of a longer process of regionalization in the area. In the case of the DR, the 
EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) was the main driver of the regionalization process as such. 
 
There are three No’s for EU macro-regional strategies: no new funds, no new legislation, and no new 
institutions. “No new funds” implies that the expected added value of these strategies lies in coordination of 
actions across policy areas, which should lead to more effective outcomes and a more efficient use of resources 
than individual initiatives. “No new legislation” means that the strategies take the form of a non-binding 
Communication by the European Commission which is endorsed by the European Council. “No new 
institutions” means that no new institutions are created at the EU level. DG Regio is not the process manager of 
the macro-regional strategies; it relies on the existing institutions and organizations in the macro-region. 
 
Macro-regional strategies have some characteristics which set them apart from just any other territorial 
cooperation between member states within a region (Dubois c.s., 2009; Nacchia, 2011): a multi-sectoral 
approach (i.e. coordination across policies), a multi-instrumental approach, and a multi-actor approach. More 
specifically, in the literature some efforts have been made to distinguish macro-regional strategies from multi-
level governance, and from transnational cooperation within the INTERREG framework. In this respect it is 
mentioned (Nacchia, 2011; Schymik, 2011) that multi-level governance is very much about territorial 
diversification of policies across the vertical range of different public authorities (EU-states-subnational 
authorities), and less about cross-policy issues and the involvement of private actors. An EU macro-regional 
strategy stresses the transnational, horizontal dimension of policies and aims at strengthening the territorial 
cohesion of existing cooperation at bilateral, multilateral, supranational, and subnational levels. Moreover, 
macro-regional strategies provide the basis for external cooperation in the macro-region as they include the EU 
external and neighbourhood policy fields. EU macro-regional strategies are different from the mainstream 
territorial cooperation scheme aimed at the transnational dimension (INTERREG IVB) in the sense that this 
scheme is primarily a funding scheme for a diversity of transnational projects and involves far less multi-sectoral 
coordination. Moreover, although there is some overlap between the areas covered by the 10 (European 
continental) regional INTERREG IVB programmes
12
 and the macro-regions in figure 1, some of these 
INTERREG IVB areas are rather huge and do not have a centripetal geographic feature (like a sea or a river as in 
the case of the BSR and DSR). In this respect enlargement has been an important factor for the emergence of EU 
macro—regional strategies. In the cases of the Baltic sea and the Danube river enlargement meant that these 
waters became –to a large extent- internal EU waters. Enlargement also changed the geopolitical configuration 
of the EU, in terms of centre and periphery. By combining old and new member states, and the periphery and the 
centre, EU macro-regional strategies can contribute to territorial cohesion in Europe (Schymik, 2011). 
 
4.2 The Benelux Union 
The so-called Low Countries are the historical lands around the low-lying delta of the Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse 
rivers, and include the modern countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and parts of northern France 
and western Germany. The term originates from the Late Middle Ages. For centuries, the Low Countries have 
                                                 
12
 Northern Periphery, Baltic Sea, North West Europe, North Sea, Atlantic Coast, Alpine Space, Central Europe, 
South West Europe, Mediterranean, South East Europe . 
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been united, separated and re-united. As from 1430 the Low Countries were under the rule of the Dukes of 
Burgundy, followed by Habsburg rule. In 1512 Charles V established the so-called Burgundian Circle as one of 
the imperial circles of the Holy Roman Empire. In 1549 (after the Diet of Augsburg of 1548) he declared the 17 
provinces of the Circle inseparable. Nevertheless, 30 years later, in 1579, separation did take place, as the seven 
protestant Northern provinces, during the Eighty Years’ War, formed the Union of Utrecht, with the ten catholic 
Southern provinces remaining under Spanish rule. This situation, which lasted for more than two centuries (i.e. 
the Republic of the United Netherlands, later called the Batavian Republic), ended with the accession, in 1806, 
of Louis Bonaparte (Napoleon’s brother) to the throne of the newly established “puppet” Kingdom of Holland, 
placing all the Low Countries under French rule. After Napoleon was driven out of the Low Countries in 1813 
(followed by his defeat at Waterloo in 1815), William VI of Orange (aka William I of the Netherlands) became 
king of the Dutch and Belgian Netherlands (the latter having been under Spanish, Austrian and French rule 
consecutively) and became grand duke of Luxembourg. This reunification lasted for only 15 years as Belgium 
separated itself from the Kingdom in 1830, with Luxembourg temporarily being brought under Belgian rule, 
until it also became fully independent in 1839. 
In the second part of the 19
th
 century and the first decades of the 20
th
 century the three independent nation states 
flourished economically, through increased trade, the development of a strong agricultural sector and the 
establishment of new manufacturing industries. Relations between the states normalized rapidly. In 1846 a treaty 
on trade was conducted between the three states. After Luxembourg, for political reasons, retreated from the 
German Zollverein (in 1919), a treaty was conducted in 1921 which laid the foundations for an economic union, 
i.e. a common Benelux market. Economic decline in the interbellum led to an initial delay in the implementation 
of these plans, but the 1932 Treat of Ouchy provided for a decrease in import duties and abolished protectionist 
measures. A number of treaties conducted in 1943 and 1944 led to the birth of the Benelux customs union, on 
January 1, 1948, which eventually was to progress into a full-fledged internal market. On November 1, 1960, the 
–consolidated- Treaty on Benelux Economic Union (BEU, conducted in 1958) came into force, effectively 
creating such a common market. In June 2008 the Treaty was renewed. 
The main policy area that the Benelux has been involved in is market integration (including integration in the 
field of intellectual property rights). This is still the core of the Benelux activities, even though these activities 
have largely been become part of the mainstream common market policies of the EU. In addition the Benelux 
has been involved in specific issues of cross-border cooperation. Recently, with the renewal of the Benelux 
treaty, the Benelux has identified a couple of new policy areas it has or will be engaged in: innovation, 
sustainable development and justice & home affairs. More recently, we can witness an increase in joint political 
statements by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, on topical issues in a variety of policy areas.
13
 
Another recent feature is the “flirt” between the Benelux and the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (see 
Andringa, 2010, for a detailed discussion). In December 2008 (just after the renewal of the Benelux Treaty) a 
partnership agreement was signed between the Benelux and Nordrhein-Westfalen (effective from 2012), which 
deals with five policy areas: disaster management, police cooperation, air pollution, spatial planning, and food 
safety.  
                                                 
13
 For example: on Friday March 15, 2013, the Benelux countries issued a joint statement to urge for unity on the 
part of the EU on the issue of supply of weapons to the Syrian opposition. 
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The Benelux is an intergovernmental organization. Decisions are taken unanimously. They only become legally 
valid after they have been incorporated into national legislation. The Committee of Ministers is the main 
decision-making body of the Benelux and is made up of the ministers of the three countries. The Committee has 
a different composition depending on the issues at hand, and has a rotating presidency. In EU terms the 
Committee is the Council of Ministers. The Benelux Council consists of high-level civil servants of the three 
member states. It is in charge of preparation of Committee decisions (in EU terms: Coreper). The Secretariat-
General is in charge of implementation of decisions and resembles the EU Commission. The Benelux parliament 
is not chosen directly, but is made up of national parliamentarians. In that sense it resembles the “old” European 
Parliament, before EP became a directly elected body in 1977. As with the EU the Benelux also has a court, 
similar inset-up to the EU Court of Justice. 
The legal instruments of the Benelux again are very similar to the EU: regulations, directives and 
recommendations can be issued by the Committee of Ministers. The Benelux budget is set for a period of five 
years. This multi-annual budget is funded by the member states based on their national income. Within this 
multi-annual framework the Committee of Ministers sets annual budgets. 
 
4.3 The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) & the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) 
As with the Low Countries, the countries of the Baltic Sea rim (i.e. a coastline of 8.000 km) have a complicated 
history of political unions, separations and conflicts. Roughly, according to Tassinari (2004), the Baltic Sea 
region comprises the German Länder of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
Northern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the Leningrad and Kaliningrad oblasti (regions) and the St. 
Petersburg Municipality, Finland, Sweden and Denmark. 
The Council of the Baltic Sea States, which is the main political forum of the region, was officially founded in 
1992, but as Tassinari (2004) and Williams (2005) argue, the region-building period started already in 1988, as 
the initial ideas of region-building in the Baltic Sea region arose parallel to the main changes that took place in 
the late 1980s in Europe in general and the specific geopolitical changes in the Baltic states. During this period 
of region-building references were made to various earlier regional cooperation schemes in this area, including 
the Hansa cooperation which stretched from the 14
th
 to the 16
th
 century. Within the BSR, and in addition to the 
CBSS, in the 90s there were other well-established cooperation schemes (of which some still exist), like he 
Nordic Council (since 1952, for inter-parliamentary and inter-governmental cooperation, originally between 
Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Swede; now also including Finland, and associate and observer members from 
the Baltic Sea region), HELCOM (environmental policy), VASAB (transnational spatial planning), the NB8-
group, Baltic 21, the Union of Baltic Cities, the Baltic Development Forum, the Nordic Council of Ministers, 
and various INTERREG programmes and projects in the region (including Baltic Sea Region Programme). The 
multitude of actors already involved in cooperation schemes in the region was reflected in the large number of 
organizations (109) that participated in the written public consultation on the EUBSR in 2008; interestingly 
enough, some member states refused to speak out and contributed so-called non-papers. 
 
The EUSBSR was initiated in 2005 by the Europe Baltic Intergroup (i.e. an informal group of MEPs from the 
Baltic Sea region) as a spin-off from the 2005 Parliament’s resolution on the Northern Dimension. The outline 
for an EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was drawn up by Henrik Iilves (Estonian MEP, later Estonian 
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President), later followed up by a EP report by Finish MEP Alexander Stubb (later Finland’s foreign minister). 
Germany and Finland (during their presidencies in 2006 and 2007) tried to sell the idea to other member states, 
but initially the idea did not meet with enthusiasm in the European Council. It was taken up again by Sweden in 
the run-up to its presidency in 2009; the European Council invited the European Commission to present a 
EUSBSR by June 2009, which was then endorsed in October 2009. 
 
Metzger (2010, following Marres) argues that in the 1990s in the Baltic Sea region a regional public or 
“community of concern” had begun to emerge, which raised issues concerning security, the environment and 
economic development, but this community was not fully able to turn these issues into a coherent whole. This is 
exactly what the EUSBSR focused on: the transformation of a loose regional public into a more stabilized 
regional stakeholder community and the translation of multiple interests into a set of shared interests (Metzger, 
2010). Schymik (2011) also points to the growing dissatisfaction over the stagnating cooperation in the region, 
after a dynamic start following the end of the Cold War. He argues that after integration of the eastern states into 
EU and NATO was achieved, the regional cooperation temporarily lost its driver. The EU macro-regional 
approach revitalized the process of transnational cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region (Dühr, 2011). Metzger & 
Schmitt (forthcoming) state that the EUSBSR solidified Baltic Sea regional cooperation, by formalizing the soft 
space of the region. 
Although it could be argued that with the development of the EUSBSR the CBSS has become less important 
(and EU institutions have become more important), the CBSS still is the overall political forum for inter-
governmental cooperation in the BSR. It deals with five policy domains/priorities: environment/sustainable 
development, economic development, energy, education and culture, civil security and the human dimension. 
The Members of the Council are the eleven states of the Baltic Sea Region (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, and Sweden) as well as the European 
Commission. The Council consists of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs from each Member State and a member 
of the European Commission. The Presidency of the Council rotates among the Member States on an annual 
basis. The role of the Council is to serve as a forum for guidance and overall coordination among the 
participating states. The foreign minister of the presiding country is responsible for coordinating the Council’s 
activities and is assisted in this work by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The Committee of Senior 
Officials (CSO) consists of high ranking representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Member 
States as well as of the European Commission. The CSO serves as the main discussion forum and decision-
making body for matters related to the work of the Council between Ministerial Sessions. The CSO monitors, 
facilitates and aims to coordinate the work of all CBSS structures. The CSO and its Expert Groups are serviced 
by the Permanent International Secretariat of the CBSS, which was established in 1998. The mandate of the 
Secretariat is to provide technical and organisational support to the Chairman of the CBSS and the structures and 
working bodies of the Council; to ensure continuity and enhanced coordination of CBSS activities; to implement 
the CBSS Information and Communication Strategy; to maintain the CBSS archives and information database; 
to maintain contacts with other organisations operating in and around the Baltic Sea region, the national 
authorities of Member States and the media. 
As the CBSS focuses on specific cooperation projects, it does not require specific legislative competencies. It 
does not have a general budget or project fund. Members are responsible for funding common activities and/or 
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for seeking and coordinating financing from other sources. Since 1998, the CBSS Member States have financed 
jointly the Permanent International Secretariat of the CBSS. 
 
Returning to the EUSBSR, the EUSBRS as such is set out in a communication by the European Commission, 
elaborated upon in more detail in its Action Plan, and evaluated/accounted for in annual reports. The Action Plan 
prioritizes the activities into 15 priority areas, organized into four thematic pillars and a horizontal section. Every 
priority area has got flagship projects. The four thematic pillars are: environment, prosperity, accessibility and 
attractiveness, and safety and security. For each priority area, some EU member states are designated as 
coordinators (contrary to the EUDSR non-EU states do not act as coordinators within the EUSBSR). The 
strategy is overseen by a High Level Group of all EU member states. Figure 2 shows the governance system of 
the EUSBSR. 
 
Figure 2: Governance system of the EUSBSR (from: http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/pages/governance) 
 
 
 
4.4 The Danube Region (DR) & the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) 
Just as in 2004 the Baltic Sea became a common EU sea, in 2007 the Danube river largely became an internal 
EU river. Historically, cooperation in the Danube Region started developing right after World War II, in order to 
coordinate the navigation of the Danube river, more generally to coordinate transport issues, but also involving 
cultural exchange. During the Cold War the region served as a link between East and West. During the 90s the 
region went through deep political transformation and conflicts (Balkan wars). In addition to 
navigation/transport issues, security and stability issues become important, as well as the environmental 
protection of the Danube river. In this period several international organizations became important players: the 
OSCE, the UN, NATO, the Council of Europe, and of course the EU. EU involvement consisted of bilateral 
arrangements with outsiders (accession partnerships; use of IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance); 
Stabilization & Association Agreement; European Partnership; Partnership & Cooperation Agreements within 
the ENP framework) and through EU cohesion policy. Just as in the case of the BSR in the DR various 
organizations and networks were active, before introducing the EUSDR. The OCSE initiated the Danube 
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Cooperation Process, which replaced the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the South East Cooperation 
Initiative (SECI, founded in 1996, on US initiative). In 1996 Bulgaria initiated the South-East European 
Cooperation Process and in 2008 the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) was established. Various other 
organizations were active as well, mainly concerned with the management of the Danube river: Danube 
International Commission (set up in 1948, fully operational as from 1964), International Sava River Basin 
Commission, ISBRC, 2001), International Commission for the Protection of the Danube River (ICPDR, 1998), 
Working Community of the Danube Countries (1989), Council of Danube Cities and Regions (CDCR, launched 
in 1998, formally established in 2009) and various NGOs and business associations. 
The institutional landscape of the DR prior to introducing the EUSDR was far more complex than that of the 
BSR in the 90s. Still, compared to the BSR the DR is hardly unified by a shared regional identity or culture; the 
EUSDR involves more region-building than the EUSBSR. The main drivers for regional cooperation are shared 
political and historical developments, the felt need to respond to integration processes in other parts of Europe, 
the wish to overcome political divides from the past, and obviously the management of the Danube river. The 
external dimension is more prominent with the EUSDR than with the EUSBSR. 
Compared to the EUSBSR the role of EP was less prominent; only when the EUDSR was already in the process 
of development (i.e. shortly after European Council decision of June 2009 to create a EUSDSR), a Danube 
Intergroup was set up in EP (July 2009). The main driver has been the European Commission which called for a 
EUSDR, backed by Austria, Serbia, Slovakia, Romania en Baden-Württemberg. The idea met with enthusiasm 
in the European Council right away. The European Council asked the European Commission to prepare EUDSR, 
to be adopted in 2011. A consultation procedure was launched (February-June 2010), in which all EU member 
states openly participated on a broad scale (Schymik, 2011), as well as third countries including Russia (which 
was far less reserved regarding this strategy than regarding the EUSBSR). The EUSDR was adopted in 2011, 
under the Hungarian presidency. 
In terms of governance, the EUSDR is constructed in the same way as EUSBSR (strategy in a European 
Commission communication, on which an Action Plan is build), with pillars, priority areas, and coordinators. 
The four pillars are: connecting the Danube Region, environmental protection, prosperity, and strengthening the 
Danube Region. In contrast to the EUSBSR here we find that non-EU countries in some cases are part of 
coordinators group (always coupled to one or more EU member states), except for the area of security/safety. 
 
4.5 Application of the analytical framework 
 
Dimension: time 
Permanent or temporary 
All three macro-regions are permanent features of differentiation. In the case of the Benelux, the treaty 
arrangements have recently been renewed. In the case of the EUSBSR and the EUSDR the time frame is 
undetermined; a long-term perspective is used, with the possibility of revision of the strategies (see also 
Matarrelli, 2012). 
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Dimension: matter 
Single issue or multiple issue 
All three macro-regions deal with multiple issues. In the case of the EUSBSR and the EUSDR the multi-sectoral 
approach is one of the defining characteristics of the strategies; in the case of the Benelux, it originally dealt with 
a single issue (cross-border trade), but is has developed into a cooperation scheme that deals with a multitude of 
issues. 
 
Geographical proximity important to the issue(s) or not 
Again, territoriality is essential to the macro-regional strategies. Both the BSR and the DR are centred around a 
natural entity (sea, river) and all pillars and priorities do have a distinct geographic dimension, although one 
could argue that in the case of the DR the extent to which the region is united by a number of functional 
characteristics is less than in the case of the BSR. 
In the case of the Benelux, to some issues the geographical aspect is important, but especially when it comes to 
the cooperation by the three countries in order to bundle bargaining power within the EU, increasingly non-
geographically determined issues are involved. 
 
Inside EU policy domain or outside 
The EUSBSR and the EUSDR are internal EU strategies. Although there is no specific Treaty clause that refers 
to such strategies, they have been developed as part of the objective of territorial cohesion. As such, but also if 
we look at the specific pillars of the strategies, they stay within the EU policy domain. 
The same is true for the Benelux: market integration, innovation, sustainable development and justice & home 
affairs are all issues within the EU policy domain, on which integration deepens between the three countries (and 
its German partner). 
 
Dimension: drivers 
Top-down or bottom-up 
According to Nacchia (2011), Dühr (2011) and Van der Zwet & McMaster (2012, following Armali and Salines) 
the macro-regional strategies involved a mix of (or: balance between) bottom-up and top-down approaches. For 
instance, regional cooperation in the BSR started bottom-up (already in the 80s) by development of networks of 
sub-national and private actors, but nation states then built on this, followed by the EU (mainly EP and/or 
European Commission). Regional cooperation in the DSR was more led by international organizations and has 
relatively more top-down features than regional cooperation in the BSR. 
Benelux cooperation is the result of a top-down approach; later, when the Benelux was incorporated into the EU 
framework, bottom-up regional cooperation (cross-border cooperation) emerged, but mainly within the 
INTERREG framework. 
 
Central government driven or regionally/locally driven 
As with the establishment of the Benelux, central governments have been crucial to the development of the 
macro-regional strategies. Although sub-national actors have been important, the process of macro-
regionalization primarily has also been driven by central governments. 
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Dimension: membership 
Small/narrow involvement or large/broad partnership 
In terms of countries involved, the Benelux is a small macro-region, whereas the EUSBSR and the EUSDR are 
large/broad partnerships. 
 
Open/fuzzy or closed/strict delimitation 
All three regions are open, but to a very limited extent. It is hard to see how the (EUS)BSR and the (EUS)DR 
can geographically enlarge, given that they currently already encompass all relevant territory. However, here we 
must make a distinction between the macro-regional strategy and the broader regional cooperation scheme. For 
example, if we take the case of the BSR, the strategy is clearly EU-centred (and as such not open or fuzzy), but 
one of the main political entities in the region, the CBSS, is open, as is shown by the involvement of many 
observer states (Belarus, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, the Ukraine, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America) and of various strategic partners. 
With the Benelux, the recent cooperation with Nordrhein-Westfalen shows that there is less strict delimitation of 
its boundaries than previously. 
 
Nation states or multi-level 
Central governments are the nodes of the macro-regional governance systems (Stocchiero, 2010). In forging the 
macro-regional strategies, the EU and its member states were important, but also in the actual governance of the 
strategies.
14
 EU member states are the main actors in the European Council and have general oversight power 
through High Level Groups. The role of subnational actors in macro-regions is limited to consultation in the 
initiation & policy making phases, weak in the management phase (where central governments and the European 
Commission are responsible) and mainly concerns the implementation phase (Van der Zwet & McMaster, 2012): 
Still, membership and involvement in coordination is possible for sub-national authorities. In the EUSBSR 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern is one of the coordinators for tourism, and Hamburg for education. In the EUDSR 
Bavaria is coordinator for biodiversity, Baden-Württemberg for competitiveness of enterprises. 
The Benelux is an intergovernmental organization in which the nation states dominate. However, in addition to 
involvement of sub-national authorities in specific projects, there is multi-level governance, if we take into 
account the cooperation with Nordrhein-Westfalen. 
 
Public or public+private 
The same as for sub-national authorities, but even more so, is true for private actors, in all three macro-regions: 
involved in the actual implementation of projects, but hardly in the policy making and coordination domains. 
Obviously, they are part of the macro-regional networks, but they are not “full” members of the formal regional 
cooperation schemes. At heart, all three macro-regions are governmental entities.  
 
                                                 
14
 As Williams (2005) shows, the initial ideas of Schleswig-Holstein’s prime minister Engholm for a truly non-
governmental Baltic Sea Forum or New Hanse, supported by Sweden’s minister (and later ambassador to 
Germany) Hellström, were slightly weakened by interventions from the German foreign Minister Genscher and 
his Danish counterpart Elleman-Jensen, who insisted on a significant role for the nation states in the CBSS. 
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EU-only or EU+outside
15
 
The Benelux fully falls within EU territory; the EUSBRS and the EUSDR include partners from outside of the 
EU. 
 
Dimension: institutions 
Embedded in existing framework or new/own institutional framework 
The EU macro-regional strategies have led to a situation where the regional cooperation has been embedded into 
the EU institutional framework. In the case of the EUSBRS a dense and hardly manageable array of 
transnational organisations and networks already existed. The EUSBSR aimed at a realignment of the 
institutional structure, mainly with a view towards the CBSS, which is not any longer the leading political 
council cooperation in the region as this role has been taken over by the EU (Schymik, 2011). Though its role 
may be less prominent, the CBSS still has its own (intergovernmental) institutional framework. 
In the case of the EUSDSR, the transnational institutional landscape was weakly developed. The EU stepped in, 
and in line with one of three No’s no new institutions were established, but still there are calls for a Danube 
Council, especially to better accommodate third states (Schymik, 2011). 
In the case of the Benelux, there is a separate institutional framework, which preceded the EU framework, but 
has become perfectly aligned with it. Within its member states the institutional set-up (especially the role of the 
Benelux parliament) is increasingly discussed, in light of this embeddedness, which leads to all kinds of overlap. 
 
Highly institutionalized or loosely organized 
Both the EU framework for the macro-regional strategies and the Benelux framework are highly 
institutionalized. 
 
Dimension: decision-making 
Embedded in existing decision-making or new/sovereign club decision-making 
What goes for the institutional framework is also true for decision-making: almost perfectly embedded into EU 
decision-making (even though in the case of Benelux, decision-making is sovereign and the Benelux has its own 
legislative order). 
 
Dimension: mode of governance 
Hierarchical/centralized/closely managed/regulated or loose/open/flexible coordination 
Coordination within the macro-regional strategies does not involve (new) legislation or funding. The strategies 
as such are non-binding communications, endorsed by the European Council. The Benelux uses hard as well as 
soft coordination (in that way it mirrors the current use of both types of coordination in the EU). It has moved 
                                                 
15
 Schymik (2011) combines the external dimension, the broadness of membership, and countries’ sizes into 
what he calls “symmetry”. He argues that the (EUS)BSR and (EUS)DR are reasonably symmetrical (Schymik, 
2011): the countries as such, and taken together are small enough to have  an equal incentive to raise their stature 
and influence within the EU through transnational cooperation, and they are mainly within the EU (BSR: 8 
insiders, 3 outsiders; DSR: 8 insiders, 6 outsiders). According to him no other macro-regions can be found in the 
EU that have the same balance, which limits the transferability of the current experiences. 
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away from its single focus on market integration through harmonization of legislation and is more oriented 
towards cooperation through projects in the policy fields it has newly embraced. 
 
Structure-oriented or process-oriented 
Because of the three No’s emphasis within the macro-regional strategies is on processes and outcomes rather 
than on building and maintaining structures. Again, the Benelux shows a mix of both approaches; historically, it 
has always paid close attention to the institutional set-up (which served as a role model for and is very much 
similar to the set-up of the European communities) but increasingly it is oriented towards process and outcomes. 
 
Fixed responsibilities (with accountability schemes) or shared responsibilities (based on trust) 
In all three cases responsibilities and accountability schemes are very clearly outlined. This is especially true for 
the Benelux (where responsibilities and accountability are well-defined and linked up to its institutional 
structure, which includes a parliament and a conflict-settling court, but also for the EUSBSR and the EUSDR, 
where the European Commission and the member states are responsible. 
 
Table 6 lists the outcomes of the application of the analytical framework on the three macro-regions. 
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Table 6: Outcomes of application of the analytical framework for three EU macro-regions 
DIMENSIO
N 
Variation BENELUX BALTIC SEA 
REGION 
DANUBE 
REGION 
Time Permanent or temporary Permanent Permanent Permanent 
Matter Single issue or multiple issue Increasingly multiple 
issue 
Multiple issue Multiple issue 
Geographical proximity important 
to the issue(s) or not 
Geographical 
proximity important, 
but not on all issues 
Geographical 
proximity 
essential (Baltic 
Sea) 
Geographical 
proximity 
essential 
(Danube river) 
Inside EU policy domain or 
outside 
Inside EU policy 
domain 
Inside EU 
policy domain 
Inside EU 
policy domain 
Drivers Top-down or bottom-up Top-down Mixed Mixed 
Central government driven 
(nation states) or 
regionally/locally driven 
Central government 
driven 
Central 
government 
driven 
Central 
government 
driven 
Membership Small/narrow involvement or 
large/broad partnership 
Small/narrow Large/broad Large/broad 
Open/fuzzy or closed/strict 
delimitation 
Open (limited) Mixed 
(EUSBSR <> 
region as such) 
Mixed 
(EUSDR <> 
region as 
such) 
Nation states or multi-level Nation states + 
multi-level 
Multi-level Multi-level 
Public or public+private Public Public + private Public 
EU-only or EU+outside EU only EU+outside EU+outside 
Institutions Embedded in existing framework 
or own/new framework 
Own institutions, but 
aligned with EU 
framework 
Embedded in 
EU framework 
Embedded in 
EU framework 
Highly institutionalized or loosely 
organized 
Highly 
institutionalized 
Highly 
institutionalized 
Highly 
institutionali-
zed 
Decision-
making 
Embedded in existing decision-
making or new/sovereign club 
decision-making 
Sovereign club-
decision-making, but 
embedded in EU 
decision-making 
Embedded in 
EU decision-
making 
Embedded in 
EU decision-
making 
Mode of 
governance 
Hierarchical/centralized/closely 
managed/regulated  or 
loose/open/flexible coordination 
Mixed Open 
coordination 
Open 
coordination 
Structure-oriented or process-
oriented 
Mixed Process-oriented Process-
oriented 
Fixed responsibilities (with 
accountability schemes) or shared 
responsibilities (based on trust) 
Fixed responsibilities Fixed 
responsibilities 
Fixed 
responsibili-
ties 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis leads to the following conclusions. 
First, the EUSBSR and the EUSDR are largely identical, even though the two strategies involve regions that are 
different in terms of regional identity and historical background. The main difference is that in the BSR there 
seems to be more involvement of private actors. Secondly, the Benelux differs from the two “new” macro-
regions. It is more top-down driven, it is relatively small (in terms of participating countries), it does not reach 
outside of the EU and it has its own institutions and decision-making procedures. Thirdly, when looking at the 
Benelux on the one hand and the other regions at the other hand, it can be argued that some convergence has 
taken place. The Benelux has started cooperation with Nordrhein-Westfalen, which diminishes it “nation states 
only”-character and brings it closer to the multi-level character of the other two regions. It is increasingly 
involved in multiple issues, with more open coordination and more orientation towards processes. On the other 
hand, the EU macro-regional strategies have brought institutionalization to more or less fuzzy, fluid and 
heterogeneous cooperation schemes that emerged after the end of the Cold War in the BSR and the DR, as part 
of the process of EU accession of most of the countries involved. The EU macro-regional approach has lifted 
such transnational cooperation out of the domain of intergovernmental cooperation and into the sphere of EU 
multi-level governance with a stronger role for supranational institutions (Dühr, 2011). Or to put it differently: 
the EU has effectively taken over these regional cooperation schemes and has successfully imposed its 
institutional framework. In that sense, macro-regions (as appearances of differentiated integration and 
regionalization) are no threat to EU integration; through its macro-regional strategies the EU has actually 
strengthened its position. 
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